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COMTROLLING COMPUTER ABUSE: AM EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES
Detmar W. Straub, Jr.
Management Information Systems
Curtis L. Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT
Considerable evidence has come to light that information systems are vulnerable to dangerously high
and persistent abuse and that managers perceive this threat to be high. The organizational response
to abusive potential has been to implement a computer security administrative unit with the charge
of deterring and preventing computer abuse.
Exactly how effective are the countermeasures employed by these units? This victimization survey
of 1,211 randomly selected DPMA organizations has determined that computer abuse can be con-
trolled through a set of deterrent administrative procedures and through preventive security soft-
ware. Understanding these relationships should greatly assist IS managers in allocating resources to
the security function and in disseminating this pertinent information to top management.
INTRODUCTION show the dire potential for large scale thefts by
high tech embezzlers. Parker's SRI databank of
This study addresses the problem of computer computer abuse (Parker 1976) cited averages of
system security. Its purpose is to ascertain ways in $500,000 while computer crimes in state and local
which computer systems are being abused and to government appear to average $329,000 (Allen 1977).
assess the effect of current countermeasures on the The extent of the problem is perhaps demonstrated
incidence of computer abuse/crime. For the most convincingly in the fact that a large per-
purposes of this study, computer abuse was defined centage of major U.S. firms (25%) are uncovering
as an intentional misuse of organizational resources serious incidents of abuse each year (ABA 1984).
such as computer service, hardware, data, and
programs.1 Future losses from computer abuse could be even
more damaging. Anti-social individuals are
As rapidly as technical security measures have been becoming increasingly proficient in disrupting
advancing, the potential for large individual losses computer service, stealing data and programs, and
in the tens of millions of dollars is growing faster creating general havoc in the information systems
Still (Parker 1983, 1984). Case histories and sample they have targeted as victims (Lee, Segal and Steier
survey data to date enumerate organizational losses 1986; Straub 1986b; Marbach 1983; Parker 1983,
at every point on the impact continuum (AICPA 1976). More disturbing even than this maliciousness
1984; Colton et al. 1982a, 1982b; Straub 1986a; are indications that hard core criminal elements are
Whiteside 1978), losses which can rapidly aggregate poised to plunder the nation's informational
to a staggering total. The American Bar Associa- storehouses on a systematic basis (Parker 1983;
tion survey (ABA 1984) reports total dollar losses of Conover 1984; Sokolik 1980).
approximately $.5 billion for 72 firms; a simple
projection of this figure to the entire United States Along with evidence that abuse is taking place
business community suggested to the task force that nationally at a dangerous rate, information system
computer abuse was an "enormous" problem in the (IS) managers perceive the problems of computer
United States (p. xii). Furthermore, "known and abuse (and error) to be significant. Computer trade
verifiable losses" in this study averaged in the journals and weeklies regularly feature computer
millions of dollars. Although distribution of losses security as a topic of interest. Additional
from computer abuse are heavily skewed by large compelling evidence for the importance of the
variances (Parker 1976), averages of this size do subject is indicated by the frequency with which
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security and control are cited as a key management frequency distributions of abuse by dollar loss
issue in opinion surveys of IS managers. category, offender motivation type, and victim
industry type -- do address important questions
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO COMPUTER about the phenomenon of computer abuse. But the
ABUSE: SECURITY ROLES AND TASKS data has not been tested through cross tabulations
nor through more sophisticated techniques such as
Perception of the latent vulnerability of modern multivariate or nonparametric tests.
computerized systems has led to the slow accretion
of specialized computer security units within The belief that countermeasures can be implemented
organizations and the implementation of classes of to reduce the risk of abuse does appear, however,
countermeasures (Straub and Hoffer 1987). About throughout the abuse literature in the form of
half of the organizations polled in a 1985 survey authoritative opinion (Sokolik 1980; Madnick 1978).
(Straub 1986a) assigned staff to the administration Parker specifically advocates the value of deterrent
of computer security on a full or part-time basis. countermeasures in numerous places in his works
In terms of organizational structure, most of these (Parker 1981, 1983). Deterrents, such as guidelines
administrators are situated in the information and policy statements, are instrumental, he believes,
systems area. Some common titles include "Director in lowering abuse by white collar amateurs. The
of Data Security," "Manager of Computer Security," purposes of such deterrents are: 1) to clarify
and "Computer Security Administrator" (Straub exactly what constitutes legitimate use of the
1986a). information system and 2) to discourage weakly
motivated potential offenders by the threat of
Security administrators employ a range of techni- serious consequences resulting from system misuse
ques to guard against purposeful or accidental (cf. also Gilhooley 1980; Dunn 1982).
system misuse.2 Two classes of these counter-
measures -- namely, deterrent and preventive Other countermeasures that are believed to have a
countermeasures -- are being evaluated in this major effect on abuse include preventive physical
study. Deterrents are those essentially passive, and software measures. The most common form of
administrative controls that take no active role in software access control is password protection.
restricting the use of system resources. Examples Other sophisticated security features that screen for
include distributed guidelines specifying conditions a wide spectrum of conditionalities of use such as
for proper use of the system and Computer Security time of day, previous unsuccessful logins, etc. have
Awareness Training Sessions. Preventives, on the been modelled (Hartson and Hsaio 1976) and are
other hand, screen access to the system and now available in commercial packages.
theoretically admit only authorized users. Locks on
computer equipment room doors are examples of In sum, there is a considerable body of authorita-
physical restraints whereas software locks on tive opinion about the nature of abuse and
accounts, files, transactions, and data items are circumstances that are thought to minimize it. Soft
instances of programmed restraints. controls such as policy statements and security
awareness training as well as hard controls such as
RELEVANT LITERATURE password access controls are believed to be
effective against abuse, but no substantive, empir-
Exactly how effective have the countermeasures ical evidence has been collected to underwrite this
employed by these security units been?3 Unfor- opinion. Moreover, even though prior work has
tunately, prior studies do not answer questions measured a host of variables associated with abuse,
about the causal linkage between activities of scientific controls -- internal validities as they are
security administrators, their use of security generally understood (Cook and Campbell 1979)--
software, and computer abuse. These studies are missing from these endeavors.
include both victimization surveys (ABA 1984; AICPA
1984; Kusserow 1983 [otherwise known as the PCIE The current study investigates whether computer
study, for President's Council on Integrity and abuse can be controlled through countermeasures
Efficiency]; Local Government Audit Inspectorate currently being employed by IS security units. In
1981) and archival data gathered from media and this respect alone, it goes beyond prior studies in
police reports of abuse (Parker 1976, 1981). the field. Besides using statistical analyses to
Descriptive statistics presented in prior studies- - determine the manner in which variables correlate,
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it also attempts to gather more accurate data about other disciplines include Kriebel and Moore (1980)
the abuse phenomenon by rigorous validation of its and Bariff and Ginzberg (1980).
research instrument.
An obvious reference discipline for activities that
involve a violation of social codes is criminology,
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OPERATIONAL and this discipline provides a ready behavioral
DEFINITION OF COMPUTER ABUSE explanation for why deterrents may be effective
controls. The most applicable theory, General
Based on the literature search, two primary research Deterrence theory, has well established research
questions have been devised for the study: constructs and causal relationships. There is a
long-standing tradition of research in this area and
o Are deterrent and preventive countermeasures concurrence by panels of experts on the explanatory
effective in controlling abuse? power of the theory (Blumstein 1978; Cook 1982).
Constructs and measures have been developed to
o What role do other organizational factors play in test the theory since the early 19605, and its
controlling abuse? application to the computer security environment is
now timely.
Because of the varying ways in which the term
'"computer abuse" has been used, the term was
restricted in this study to the abuse perpetrated by The thrust of most of the theoretic deterrence
individuals against organizations (Kling 1980). The literature has been on "disincentives" or sanctions
working definition presented to study respondents against committing a deviant act. Disincentives are
was: traditionally divided into two related but indepen-
dent, conceptual components: 1) certainty of
Computer abuse is unauthorized, deliberate, and sanction and 2) severity of sanction (Blumstein
internally recognizable misuse of assets of the 1978). The theory holds that under conditions in
local organizational information system by indivi- which risk of being punished is high and penalties
duals, including violations against: for violation of norms are severe, potential
offenders will refrain from illicit behaviors.
1. Hardware (and other physical assets
associated with computers such as theft or In the literature, observable commitment of an
damage to terminals, CPUs, disk drives, and enforcement group, such as the police in punishing
printers), offenders, typically serves as a surrogate for
perception of risk or certainty of sanction (Gibbs
2. Programs (such as theft or modification of 1975). This assumes that potential offenders
programs), perceive risk to be in direct proportion to efforts
to monitor and uncover illicit behaviors. In other
3. Data (such as embezzlement or modification words, people believe that punishment will be more
of data), certain when enforcement agents explicitly or
implicitly "police," or make their presence felt to
4. Computer Service (such as unauthorized use potential offenders. In information systems, this is
of service or purposeful interruption of equivalent to security administrators making their
service). presence felt through monitoring, enforcing, and
distributing information about the organizational
policies regarding system usage, or what we have
GENERAL DETERRENCE THEORY IN THE been referring to as deterrent countermeasures.
REFERENCE DISCIPLINE, CRIMINOLOGY When punishment is severe, it is assumed that
offenders, especially less motivated potential
Reference disciplines can serve as a springboard for offenders, are dissuaded from antisocial acts (Straub
the application of established knowledge to new and Widom 1984). Table2 1 presents the pertinent
fields and emerging technologies (Dickson, Benbasat connections between the conceptual terminology we
and King 1980). Examples of articles that demon- have been using and constructs most frequently
strate the intellectual connections between MIS and cited in General Deterrence theory.
279
Table 1. Concepts, Constructs, and Measures the relationship between cause and effect in
computer abuse appears in Figure 1. The three
primary causal constructs are represented by labelsResearch Survey
Concepts Construct Ilem Measure Description within circles and causal paths as lines between
25 Numb of incidenls constructs. For the sake of clarity, the two
Abuse DAMAGE 39 Actual dollar loss
38 Opportunity dollar toss disincentive constructs have been combined as
37 - Subjective seriousness index "Deterrents" in this model. Rival hypotheses were
10 - Full-time security staff scaled so that higher values in the independentDISINCENTIVESDeterrents 1 1 - Part-time security stall
CERTAINTY 1 2 - Total security hours/week variables would be reflected in higher values in the
14b - Data security hours/week dependent variables. For example, a large number
15 - Total security staft salaries
22 - Subjective deterrent effecl of high-privileged system users would be expected
13-35 & . Longevity of security (trom to increase organizational losses from computer
3-28-36 inception to incident date) abuse.
18 - Information about proper use
DISINCENTIVES 19 - Most severe penalty for abuse
SEVERITY 22 Subjective deterrent effect
Preventives PREVENTIVES 1 6 - Use of software access control
17 - Use of specialized software
30 - Privileged status of offender
29 - Amount of collusion
Deterrentsk:.c
\-re.32 - Motivation ol offender
-liieRival ENVIRONMENTAL- 31 Employee/non-employee status -WA--Explana- MOTIVATIONAL 24 Tightness of security (Preventiv*> decrease ,(computeAtionS FACTORS 21 - Visibility Of security
28-35 & - Duration of abuse C<Abuse ,)
36 -
, En¥lronmental--General Deterrence theory, moreover, has particular ( Motlvatione] )
applicability to computer abuse. Especially strong  Factors j
.--
evidence for the efficacy of deterrents in situations
similar to computer abuse can be found throughout
the literature (cf., for example, Schwartz and
Orleans 1967). Computer abuse can be typically Figure 1. The Security Impact Model
characterized as an amateur, white collar act
(Sokolik 1980). Because computer abuse takes place
in the relatively benign environment of persons who METHODOLOGY
normally abide by rules and regulations (Sokolik
1980), it is believed that sanctions can mitigate A victimization questionnaire was chosen to
misuse of computers. That is, from the perspective determine the structural relationships between
of purposeful misuse, most offenders are amateurs. countermeasures and computer abuse and to provide
Either out of ignorance or out of a desire for the best possible measures of the dependent or
pecuniary gain, they are willing to violate social endogenous variable, abusive damage (see Appendix
norms, but are not so strongly motivated that for study instrument). Cross-sectional studies in
deterrent measures cannot inhibit them (Parker this vein have long served to evaluate causal
1981; Straub and Widom 1984).4 relationships between correlated variables in
criminological investigations (Greenberg and Kessler
MODELLING DETERRENT AND PREVENTIVE 1982; Nagin 1978; Dodge, Lentzner and Shenk 1976;
COUNTERMEASURE Skogan 1981). With modifications tailored for the
computer security environment, the victimization
The strong causal link between deterrent disincen- survey has given good service in this study.
tives and lower abusive damage are openly stated in
General Deterrence theory and in the abuse litera- Variable selection was based on theory, victimiza-
ture. Moreover, as noted above, the abuse litera- tion surveys in the criminological field, prior
ture argues that preventives are instrumental in computer abuse instruments, and abuse literature.
curbing abuse. Rival hypotheses were modelled to Theoretically-oriented variables appear in the model
rule out, wherever possible, other feasible explana- as disincentive and damage constructs, constructs







theory. The preventives construct was derived from Statistical techniques chosen for the study, the last
the abuse literature. The composite environmental- methodological component of interest, include (1)
motivational factors serving as the rival hypotheses LISREL (LInear Structural RELations) modelling and
evolved out of prior computer abuse work and (2) a set of multivariate and univariate correlational
implicit elements of General Deterrence theory. tests. These techniques complement each other
The connection among research concepts, constructs, nicely by providing different quantitative readings
and measures in the survey are shown graphically in on the data. In this study, LISREL was used to
Table 1 and is discussed in much greater detail in initially confirm or disconfirm the explanatory
Straub (1986b). power of disincentives. Additional corroborative
tests offer strengths such as distribution-free
Measures for each of the research constructs were assumptions (non-parametric tests), zero order or
devised and validated over the two year period direct effect measures (Chi-Square Contingency
1984-1985. The instrument was validated via Tables), and nonstructural tests of covariance
extensive field interviews with 35 system profes- equality (canonical correlation). A more intricate
sionals, interviews and questionnaire responses from description of the statistical procedures used to
a group of 88, and, finally, questionnaire responses analyze this data, and the analyses themselves, may
from 170. This validated survey was mailed out to be found in Straub (1986b).
a group of 5,489 randomly selected DPMA (Data
Processing Management Association) members. The Testing of the abuse data through multiple statis-
sample base that resulted from a final administra- tical techniques permits the same data set to be
tion of this survey was 1,211 with reports on 259 viewed through complementary methodologies, each
separate abusive incidents. A more detailed with its own distinct strengths and weaknesses.
description of the validation process is found in Much as multiple operations of constructs and
Straub (1986c). multiple methods of instrumentation help to validate
theories about underlying processes (Cook and
Hypotheses that reflect expected relationships Campbell 1979), the use of statistical analyses with
between independent and dependent variables in varying assumptions can grant a more three
conceptual and statistical terms are delineated in dimensional perspective on the interactions between
Figure 2. data sets. This approach is more robust than a
one-technique analysis precisely because it is not
heavily dependent on the truth of a single set of
assumptions.
Research Research
Hypotheses Questions DATA ANALYSIS
H(1): Abusive damage is significantly inhibited An initial set of tests for nonresponse bias in the
by the certainty and severity of punish- 0(1) sample data was performed to ensure that respon-
ment for abuse. dents did not differ systematically from nonrespon-
dents. Any significant effect in this case would
H(1) Damage is not independent of deterrents. reduce confidence in our ability to generalize
findings to the entire population. Results from
H(2) Abusive damage is significantly inhibited these tests indicate that nonresponse bias were not
0(1)by preventive software. present.
H(2): Damage is not independent of preventives. The data was next examined for adherence to the
Security Impact Model. LISREL analysis showed
H(3): Abusive damage is significantly inhibited that the model of deterrent efforts and abusive
by environmental-motivational factors. damage fit reasonably well, i.e., the Security Impact
Statistica ltv: Q(2) Model fits the actual sample data. Hypothesis 1,
H(3): Damage is not independent of the rival therefore, was supported in the analysis. Goodness-
hypotheses. environmental-motivational of-fit indices (.68) and variance explained (36.6%)
factors. are sufficiently large to argue in favor of the
explanatory power of the model. Causal coefficients
Figure 2. Research Hypotheses representing the negative effect of deterrents on
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damage, moreover, are statistically significant at the motivation of offender (Item 32), and c) position of
.05 level (Straub 1986b). offender (Item 30).
By means of the confirmatory factor analysis Additional tests of the causal model were utilized to
component of LISREL, factor loadings were also deepen the analysis. This series of multivariate and
estimated in the analysis. For the dependent univariate corroborative tests confirmed that
variables composing the damage construct, loading relationships do exist between theorized variable
from the number of incidents measure (Item 25) was sets and individual variables within these sets.
heaviest, followed by the subjective estimate of Canonical correlational analysis detected the
damage (Item 37). Dollar estimates of damage presence of direct dependency between deterrents
(Items 38 and 39) had low factor loadings. and damage although not between environmental-
Variables that contributed most to the deterrent and motivational factors and damage. Nonparametric
preventive constructs are shown in Table 2. analyses (Kruscal-Wallis tests and Chi-Square
Contingency Table tests) revealed that the majority
of variables loading heavily on constructs in the
Table 2. Loadings of Prominent LISREL multivariate analysis also demonstrated pairwise
Causal Factors links with the number of incidents measure (Item
25); conversely, lightly loading factors in the
multivariate analyses generally had no significant
links with abusive damage.Variable Loading
Disincentives: severity Table 3 synthesizes findings from the corroborativeanalyses as well as the LISREL analysis in a rough-
Number of informational hewn tally form. The major independent variables
sources about conduct are listed in order of importance by construct.
(Item 18) 29.543 That is, if a variable was found to be heavilyloaded and/or statistically significant at the .05Most severe disciplinary level, a tally mark appears under the applicable
action (Item 19) 23.697 test. Because canonical correlation looks at
Disincentives: certaintv relationships between sets of variables, the preven-
Total personnel tives-abuse linkage was not tested in this analysis
hours/week (Item 12) 3.400 (Hair et al. 1979).
Data security
hours/week (Item 14b) 3.022 DISCUSSION
Full-time security Interpretation of data in a field as new as computerpersonnel (Item 10) 2.755
Subjective estimate of security and abuse is by definition tenuous.
1.000 Nevertheless, the data does demonstrate patternsdeterrent effect (Item 22)
Preventives which must be taken with some seriousness so thatresearch can push ahead to more clearly specify
Number of security software causal relationships between constructs. This
packages in place (Items 16 synthesis will attempt to evaluate evidence quanti-
and 17) 3.078 tatively and qualitatively and to provide a balanced
view of the findings.
A LISREL test of the rival hypotheses showed that
they helped to improve the model fit and the Each statistical technique revealed variant perspec-
explained variance. The causal coefficient for the tives on variable relationships in the sample. It
linkage was significant, statistically and practically, would be highly unusual -- even to the point of
and the goodness-of-fit indicators were sufficiently incredulity -- were all test results identical. Some
large to support this conclusion. Hypothesis 3, of the selected techniques accommodate the
therefore, did receive support in the LISREL partialling effects of variables on each other while
analysis. Among the environmental-motivational others do not. Some transform the data into ranks
factors that demonstrated highest loadings were: a) and correlations before testing it while others test
employment status of offender (Item 31), b) a form of the data much closer to the raw data.
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Table 3. Summary of Prominent Causal Factors system usage and penalties for abusing systems.
These too appear as causal factors in the data.
According to the data, abuse may also be preventedC/1/.Id Kiuscal· CN
USAEL Co„.Ii. wa„,1 Squse To(al by means of security software. The more extensiveIndependent Variable Tw M T-1 TH, TH,
the security imposed at various system levels--
Olle,Fent i
from the file level down to the data item level--
L urik{Item 14bl X X X) < 4 the less vulnerable is the systenn to abuse.
ttnr"%.m 12) XXXX 4 Preventives and deterrents that consistently emerge
in the data analysis are:Most Severe Disciplinary
Action (Item 19) X X X X 4
Number of Inlormalional
sources about conduct X X X 3 0 Data security hours
(lam 18) o Overall security hours
Subjective Estimate of
Deterrent Effect (ltem 22) X X X 3 o Information about proper system usage
Full. Time Security o Penalties for violations
Pe,sonnel (Itam 1 0)   2 o Security softwareTotal Salaries of Security
 < 1Personnel (ltem 151
Prevent lies DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICENumber of Security
Soltware Packages in X X X 3
Place (Items 16 and 17)
Very likely, there are other explanations for
Environmental-Motivationol Fectors patterns of abuse in organizations. The presence of
Offende, Empbyment X 1 deterrents and preventives do explain lower abuseStatus (Ilem 31)
Motivation of Onende' X
to some degree, but industry type and size of EDP
(l em 32) shop aIso appear to have explanatory power (Straub
Position ot Offender(Item 30, X 1 and Hoffer 1987). Motivations, such as malicious-
ness, greed, opportunity, and incentive, may explain
a part of abusive behavior as well. Further tests
will help to unveil these underlying patterns.
Given the varieties of ways in which the data has Overall study findings reveal that General Deter-
been handled by the statistics, patterns that emerge rence theory can be successfully applied to the
independent of technique are more robust than with computer security environment. These findings need
single analytical treatments. triangulation through studies employing stronger
internal validity checks, such as field and laboratory
It should be noted first that deterrents and abusive experimentation. In this vein, a field experiment
damage proved to be related as predicted by testing the effect of strong and weak deterrence in
General Deterrence theory, and, specifically, the academic environment has already been
research hypothesis 1. Both the LISREL and completed. Replication in a business setting at
canonical correlational analyses showed these some future time can round Out this initial set of
effects; and General Deterrence theory received field tests.
distinct, though not unanimous support in the
nonparametric analyses. As rival hypotheses, Because of the strong theoretical connection
environmental-motivational factors received support between potential offender attitudes and abuse,
only in the LISREL analysis. laboratory studies might also advance our know-
ledge. In criminological studies, seriousness indices
Security countermeasures, as measured through data commonly serve to measure initial impressions about
security hours and total hours, stand out as generic perceived risk and severity of punishment in
causal factors in all tests. This has been main- particular situations. An experimental deterrent
tained by security specialists for a long time and treatment which simulates a Computer Security
thus the argument that general deterrence works in Awareness Training session could test for lower
the computer security environment now has some post-treatment indices. In addition, qualitative
tentative support. Duties of security officers often research techniques, field interviews and case
include disseminating information about proper studies, can provide variant perspectives.
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The major implication of this study for the AICPA. "Report on the Study of EDP-Related Fraud
administration of computer security is straightfor- in the Banking and Insurance Industries: Pamphlet,
ward: security appears to be effective. An active American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
and visible security staff and a commitment to data Inc., 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY,
security figure prominently in this formulation, as 1984.
do control activities in which security staff inform
users about improper system usage and penalties for Allen, B. "The Biggest Computer Frauds: Lessons
noncompliance. Security software also helps to curb for CPAs: Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 143, No. 5,
computer abuse. May 1977, 53-63.
As managers increasingly come to treat computer Bariff, M. L., and Ginzberg M. J. "MIS and the
abuse as a behavioral and people problem rather Behavioral Sciences." In E. R. McLean (ed.), Pro-
than just a technical one, the function of security ceedings of the First International Conference on
administration is gradually being incorporated into Information Systems, December 8-10, 1980,
the life stream of American business. This evolu- Philadelphia, PA, 49-58.
tion is occurring slowly in certain industrial groups.
Given the findings of this study, these industries Blumstein, Alfred. "Introduction: In A. Blumstein,
need to reevaluate their position vis-a-vis security J. Cohen, and D.Nagin (eds), Deterrence and
and seriously consider initiating, strengthening, or Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal
modifying security efforts in their firms. Sanctions on Crime Rates, National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, DC, 1978.
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3. NUMBER OF TOTAL YEARS EXPERIENCE IN/WITHPersonal Information INFORMATION SYSTEMS?
0 More than 14 years
1. YOUR POSITION: 0 11 to 14 years
0 7 to 10 years
0 President/Owner/Director/Chairman/Partner 0 3 to 6 years
0 Vice President/General Manager 0 lessthan 3 years
0 Vice President of EDP 0 Not sure
O Director/Manager/Head/Chief of EDP/MIS
0 Director/Managerof Programming Organizational Information
O Director/Manager of Systems & Procedures
O Director/Manager of Communications 4. Approximate ASSETS and annual REVENUES of your
O Director/Managerof EDPOperations organization:
O Director/Manager of Data Administration ASSETS REVENUES0 Director/Manager of Personal Computers Nail Atthis At all Atth,sO Director/Manager of Information Center Locations Location Locations location0 Data Administrator or Data Base Administrator
0 Data/Computer Security Officer 0 0 .......Over 5 Billion....... 0
0 SeniorSystemsAnalyst 0 0 . . . . . . 1 Billion-5 Billion..... 0
0 Systems/Information Analyst 0 0 · · · · · 250 Million-1 Billion.... 0
0 0 . . . 100 Million-250 Million... 0O Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer O 0 . . . .5 0 Million-100 Million . . . 00 Applications Programmer 0 0 . . . . 10 Millioo-50 Million . . . . O
O Chief/Lead/Senior Systems Programmer 0 0 . . . . .5 Million-10 Million . . . . O
0 Systems Programmer 0 0 . . . . .2 Million-5 Million...... 0
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Operator 0 0 . . . . .1 Million-2 Million . . . . . I.
O Machine orComputer Operator 0 0 . . . . . . Under 1 Million . . . . . . . /
0 0 . . . . . . . . . Not s u t e. . . . . . . . . . .
0 Vice President of Finance
O Controller 5. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES of *urorganization:O Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EDP Auditire
Alan At this0 Director/Managerof Plant/Buildir:g Security Locition Location0 EDPAuditor
O Internal Auditor 10,000=more..................... O
0 Consultant 5.000-9.999 0
0 Educator 2.500-4,999 01,000-2.499. 00 User of EDP 750-999.. 0




Feve than 6 0
2. YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS POSITION: Not sure., 0
0 President/Owner/Director/Chairman/Partner
O V-ce PresidenUGeneral Manager 6. PRIMARY END PRODUCTORSERVICE ofyourorganizationat
0 Vice President of EDP thislocation:
O Director/Manager/Head/Chief of EDP/MIS O Manufacturing and Processing
0 Director/ManagerofProgramming 0 Chemical or Phannaceutical
O Director/Managerof Systems & Procedures O Government Federal State. Municipal including Military
0 Director/Managerd Communications 0 Educational: Colleges. Universities. and other
0 Director/Managerof EDPOperations Educational Institutions
0 Director/Manager of Oata Administration 0 Computer and [)ata Processirg Services including
O Director/Manager of Personal Computers Software Services. Service Bureaus, Time-Sharing
O Director/Manager of Information Center and Consultants
O Data/Computer Security Officer O Finance: Banking, Insurance. Real Estate, Securities,
0 SeniorSystemsAnalyst and Credit
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer 0 Trade: Wholesale and Retail
0 Chief/lead/Senior Systems Programmer 0 Medical and Legal Services
O Chief/Lead/Senior Machine or Computer Operator O Petroleum
0 Transportation Services: Land. Sea, and *ir
0 Vice President of Finance 0 Utilities:Communications, Electric, Gas, and
0 Controller Sanitary Services
O Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EDP Auditing O Construction, Mining. and Agriculture
O Director/Manager of Plant/Building Security O Other (please specify).

























Computer Abuse Incident Report
(covering the 3year period, Jan. 1. 1983-jan. 1. 1986)
Instructions: Please fill outa separate report for each incidentof computer abuse that hasoccurred in the 3 year period,
Jan. 1,1983-Jan. 1.1986
28. WHEN WAS THIS INCIDENT DISCOVERED? 36. If the incident had been going on for a period of time
Month/year __ _/___
how long was that?
years months
29. HOW MANY PEOPLEWERE INVOLVED in committingthe
computer abuse in this incident? 37. in your judgment. how serious a breach of security was
this incident?
(number of perpetrators) (Choose one only)
30. POSITION(S) OF OFFENDER(S):
O Extremely serious
Main Second 0 Serious
Offendef Offender 0 Of minimal importance
Top executive. -... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · .0 0 0 Not sure
Security officer · · 0 0 0 Of negligible importance
Auditor 0 0
Controller 0 0 38. Estimated $ LOSS through LOST OPPORTUNITIES (if
measurable): (Example $3.000 in tost business
becauseofdaticorruption)
Data entry staff .. 0 0
Applications ProErammer . . . ·········· 0 0
1
Systems analyst........ ............ O 0 (estimated $ loss through lost OFFortunities)
Machineorcomputeroperator . . . . . . . . . 0 0
Ott,efEDPstalt 0 39. Estimated $ LOSS through THEFT and/or RECO
VERY
Accountant... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0 0 COSTS from abuse: (Example: $12,000 electronically
Clerical personnel.. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·0 0 embezzled plus $1.000 in satary torecover from
Student 0 0 data corruption + $1000 in legal fees = $15.000)
Consultant 0 0 f
Notsure........ .0 0 (estimated $ lossthrough theftand/orrecoverycosts)
Other 0 0
(please specify): (Main) 40. This incident was discovered-
(Choose as many as appticabie)(Second) 0 byaccided bys system user
31. STATUS(ES) OF OFFENDER(S) 0 by accident by a systerns staft member
or ar:
when incident occurred Main Second
interraVED)P auditor
0 through a computer security investigation 0(her
Offender Offender than an auditEmployee 0 0 0 by an irternal/EDP,udit
Ex-erroto,ve 0 0 0 through normal systems controls.like softwire or
NOHmoloree 0 0 pr™cedurmicontrols
Not sure 0 0 0 by an external aulit
Other 0 0 0 not sure
(please specify): (Main) 0 other (please specify
)
(Second)
31 MOTIVATION(S) OF OFFENDER(S): Main Second 41. This incident was reported to-
Offender Offender (Choose as many as ap#icabte)
Igno(,rce of properpr essiondconduct.. 0 0 0 someone in$ide *Ie local or
ganizition
Personal gain 0 0 0 someone outside the local 01:iniza
tion
Misguided playfulness 0 0 not sure
Maticiousness or re,*nge 0
Noture O 0 41 If this incident was reported to someone outside the
Other 0 0 localorganization.¥,howasthatl
(please specify): (Main)
(Choose as many as lop#cat*)
O someone at drvisional 0, co,porate headquarters
(Second) 0 themedia
0 the police
33. MAJOR ASSET AFFECTED or involved: 0 other authorities
(Choose as many as *00#cabB) 0 not sure
0 Unatrthorizeduseolcortwtersenice
O Disruption dcomputer service 43. Please briefly describe the incident and what finally
0 Dat happenedtothe perpetrator(s)
0 Hardware
O Progums




0 going on foci period d time
0 not sure
35. If a one.time incident. WHEN 010 IT OCCUR?
Month Year
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7. CITY (at this location)? STATE? 17. Other than those security Software systems you listed In
question 16. howmany SPECIALIZED SECURITY SOFTWARE
8 TOTAL NUMBER OF EDP (Electronic Data Processing) SYSTEMS are actively in use? (Exampies: ACFII. RACF)
EMPLOYEES at this location (excluding
data input personnel): Mumbe, 01 joec,al,red $ecuri:,soM-are,#ems ac ,¥ely in use)
0 More than 300 050-99
O 250-300 O 10-49 01 these. h. many were purchased trom 3 vendor' -
O 200-249 O Fewerthan 10 (nurnoer purchased l.oma yerjof)
0150-199 0 Not sure . and how many *ere developed in·houE'
0100-149 (numbe, develooed,n·houst)
9. Approximate EDPBUDGET per year of your organization 18. Throughwhat INFORMATIONALSOURCESarecornputersystem
at this location: users made aware OF THE APPROPRIATE AND INAPPRO·
O Over $20 Million O $2-$4 Million PRIATE USES OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM?
O $10-$20 Million O $1-$2 Millior, (Choose as many as applicable)
O $8-$10 Million O Under $1 Million O Distributed EDPGuidelines0 $6-$8 Million 0 Not sure
0 $4-$6 Million 0 Administrative program to classify information by sensitivity0 Periodic departmental memos and notes
0 Distributed statementsd prolessional ethicsComputer Security. Internal Audit 0 Computer Security Violations Reports
and Abuse incident Information O 0%nizational meetings
0 Computer Security Awareness Training sessions
A Computer Security function in an organization is any pur- 0 Informal discvisions
pose/u/activity that has the objective of protecting assets such 0 Other (pleaw specify)
as hardware. programs, data. andcomputer sevice fromlossor
misuse. Examples of personnel engaged in computer security 19. Which types of DISCIPLINARY ACTION do these infor-
functions include: data securityand systerns assurance officers. mational sources mention (question 18) as consequences
For this questionnaire. computer security and EOP audit tune- of purposeful computer abuse?
tions will be considered separately. (Choose85many asapplicable)
Computer EOP 0 Reprimand
Security Audit 0 Probation or suspension
10. How many staff members are O Firirs
wor*1020 hours per week ormore 0 Crimind prosecution
inthesefunctionsotthistocation? -(m:nber -(rumbe< 0 Civil p,osecution
d p.,sors) OR persons) 0 Other (please specify)
11. Howmanystaff membersare
 rt ing 19 hours per week or less in In questions 20·24, please indicate your reactions to the fol·
these functions atthis location? -  $ *  lowing statements Stro¢* . Not -
Nre® AGree Sure Oisogree Di*agree
12. What are the totnt personnel hours 20. Thoa#ve, Colrb¢XAC, sec:#ity
per weelt dedicated to these effort trns in racction in lerce0,1 to ccidcr sui;**ted post
tur--40  (101:1 .=ij= i, idorets of computer cb se cl
thiS locctio:L 00000
13. When vere these functions 21. Th,cc:hitidd©omouter
initiated? -1- -1- security cdm#¤strotors cre ¤211
C./#¢h/,) (rnorcth/,T) bno.n to us,n ot this tocction- 0 0 0 0 0
22 Thooresanco c*j cct,Mies d
computer security c>dmint=tro-
If *ur answer to the Computer Security part ofquestion 12 was tors d*cr crl,01:0 t:*10,1*011
zero, please go directly fo question 25. Othen*$4 cononue cbusa th, cor,cp,AM system at
Otis locction. 00000
14. Of these total computer security personnel hours per week 23. Rclcthgtoourt,poofc,dust,ycompler security 1$ vary(question 12), how many are dedicated to each of the cfleclhoot thks locctior, 00000
toilov,ing? 24. Ths obic!15¢curit, densoptly
A Physical security cdministrotion. disaster cttds locctionts to 020*de
recovery.ond continsency plannins . . . . -(hours/wee!0 -Yll<litticcuritywithout
tendcs# Product*. 0 0 0 0 0
8. Data security cdministrzltion.......... -(hours/wae{0
C User ond coordinctor trainins.... (hours/w@2k) 25. How many SEPARATE UNAU™ORIZED ANO DELIBERATE
0. Other - 0,ours/weet) INCIOENTSOFCOMPUTERABUSEhasyourorganizationat
(please specify) this location experienced in the 3 year period, Jan. 1.1983-
Jan. 1,1986?
15. EXPENDITURES per yer forcomputer security ot this ' (number of incidents)
location:
(Ploaso fillcuto separate "ComputerAbuse IncidentReport-
Annual computersecurity personnel salaries . . . . . S {Blue-co ored Section 111 for eoch incident)
00 you have insurance (separate policy or nde,)
specifically for computer security losses? 26. How many incidents do you have reason to suspect other
0 Yes 0 NO 0 Not sure thanthosenumberedabove inthissame 3 yearperiod, Jan.
If yes. whatis the annual cost of such insurance . . . $ 1,1983-Jan. 1.1986?
(number of suspected incidents)
16. SECURITY SOFTWARESYSTEMS available and acti*elyiM use
on the mainframe(s) [or minicompute«s)] at this location: 27. Please briefly describe the basis (bases)for these
suspicions.Nurv-De, of Numes 01
:*r 75
Operating system access control facililies
DBMS security access control facilities . . . . .
Fourth Generation softw©re access
controlfocilities.............
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